Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
UWRG Working Papers

Usery Workplace Research Group

3-2-2017

Unobserved Inputs in Household Production
Sergey Mityakov
Clemson University, smityak@clemson.edu

Thomas A. Mroz
Georgia State University, tmroz@gsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/uwrg_workingpapers

Recommended Citation
Mityakov, Sergey and Mroz, Thomas A., "Unobserved Inputs in Household Production" (2017). UWRG
Working Papers. 267.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/uwrg_workingpapers/267

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Usery Workplace Research Group at ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in UWRG Working Papers by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gsu.edu.

W. J. Usery Workplace Research Group Paper Series

Working Paper 2017-3-2
March 2017

Unobserved Inputs in Household
Production

Sergey Mityakov
Clemson University
Thomas A. Mroz
Georgia State University

This paper can be downloaded at: http://uwrg.gsu.edu

ANDREW YOUNG SCHOOL
OF POLICY STUDIES

Unobserved Inputs in Household Production
Sergey Mityakov, Thomas A. Mroz

∗

March 20, 2017

Abstract
With few exceptions, empirical household production studies ignore
unobserved inputs. We demonstrate that without additional assumptions, the estimable impacts of the observed inputs cannot provide informative estimates of their marginal products due to contaminating
variation in unobserved inputs; not even the sign of marginal impacts
can be ascertained. Instrumental variables cannot solve this problem
since every candidate for an instrument affecting an observed input,
including experimental assignments, would also affect unobserved inputs choices through the budget constraint, invalidating this variable
as an instrument. We show that under certain additional assumptions
an appropriately specified empirical model can provide bounds for true
marginal products. Our main point is that unless one is willing to
make assumptions of this nature, estimated effects would have no useful interpretation. Almost all existing empirical studies of health, child
development, and job-training programs fail to account for this issue,
rendering their conclusions incomplete and possibly misleading.
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Introduction.

To make informed policy recommendations, economists need to understand
how inputs to household production functions affect measurable outcomes like
health and children’s test scores. Two key issues make this a difficult task.
First, a household’s choices of inputs likely depend on unobserved to the researcher baseline characteristics and households’ unobserved abilities to make
use of the inputs. As a consequence, households’ choices of the levels of the inputs are likely to be statistically endogenous determinants for the estimation of
household production functions. Researchers have used a variety of approaches
to address this issue, such as better measures of productivity, experimentally
assigned inputs, instrumental variables, and natural experiments.
The second issue, which is the focus of this paper, arises because one almost
never can observe all of the inputs to production chosen by households. In general the estimable impact of an observed input on the health outcome would
confound the true marginal effect of that observed input with the marginal
effects of unobserved inputs. Instrumental variables, experiments, or other
approaches used to solve the omitted variables problem in the case of unobserved fixed household characteristics mentioned above will not solve the
omitted variable problem in this case. This happens because the unobserved
inputs are optimally chosen by households. Any “exogenous” variation in observed inputs would be associated with changes in unobserved inputs, since the
unobserved inputs are chosen subject to the same budget constraint as the observed inputs. Any exogenous or endogenous variation in any observed input
would be correlated with changes in unobserved inputs even when observed
and unobserved inputs are separable in the production function.
We use a model of utility maximization subject to a budget constraint
2
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in conjunction with a household production function to derive precise interpretations of estimated effects of observable inputs on household’s outcomes.
The economic model provides considerable guidance for researchers about the
types of variables one needs to include in a “hybrid” household production
function in order to justify these interpretations. In general, these estimated
effects do not correspond exactly to standard ceteris paribus marginal effects
of the observed inputs in the home production. Often, however, the estimated
effects will provide a bound on the magnitude of the true marginal effect. We
also show how one can improve on those bounds by controlling for the readily available but often ignored information on pure consumption goods when
estimating the hybrid production function. These bounds arise solely from a
theoretical model describing the behavior of an optimizing economic agent.
We demonstrate the potential importance of these bounds through a simple
simulation exercise.
We show that the least informative bound for the marginal product is
closely related to the “policy effect” one would estimate in an experimental
setting. In particular, if one were to randomly assign the production input
under consideration while also controlling for incomes and prices as we describe
below, then the estimated “policy effect” would be identical to the bound we
present. Averaging these conditional effects over the sample distribution of
prices and incomes would yield the simple policy effect that only examines
mean differences between the treated and untreated in the experimental study.
Given this close relationship, our bound can be used to calculate the “policy
effect” for different target populations without the need to conduct numerous
experimental studies.
While we frame our discussion in terms of health production to make the
analysis more specific, the estimation and interpretation issues we derive apply
3
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to any household maximization problem with production. This includes, for
example, estimates of the impacts of school inputs and parents’ behaviors on
children’s developmental outcomes. Given that one almost never observes all of
the relevant inputs to the household production function, our findings suggest
that most of the estimates in the literature on household production, not just
those in the health economics literature, need to be reinterpreted. Unless
researchers bring external information to bear in their analyses of household
production functions, they will be unable to validate most interpretations of
their estimates of the impacts of observed inputs as interesting technological
relationships.

2

Background

Early work on the estimation of production functions with missing inputs
mostly focused on the case where there was a fixed unobserved input that was
not varied as part of the optimization process. The motivation for these types
of formulations came from an assumption that there could be unobserved, firm
specific managerial factors affecting input choices and output levels (Hoch,
1955; Mundlak, 1961). In general, longitudinal data with firm specific fixed
effects could be used to obtain consistent estimates of the marginal impacts
of the observed inputs to the production process. More recently the industrial organization literature has explored structural methods to control for
time-varying unobserved productivity shocks that could affect a firm’s input
choices.1 Such approaches, however, typically would not work in the case when
the missing input itself is a choice variable, which is the focus of this paper.
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) took the analysis of production functions
1

Olley and Pakes(1996),
Frazer(2006).

Levinsohn and Petrin(2003),
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with missing inputs to a more fundamental level. All inputs are chosen optimally as a part of a household utility maximization process, but the researcher
does not observe the chosen levels for a subset of the inputs. They discuss a
commonly used approach, the “hybrid production function,” to deal with the
unmeasured inputs. In that approach, the researcher estimates a relationship
where output is a function of the observed inputs, the prices of the unobserved
inputs, and the household’s level of exogenous income. They demonstrate that
the estimated impact of an observed input on health outcomes in this hybrid
specification does not measure the true marginal impact of the observed input holding constant the levels of the other observed inputs and the levels
of the unobserved inputs. Unobserved inputs that are chosen as part of the
household’s utility maximization, subject to a budget constraint, result in consequences well beyond those addressed in the early literature that only had
fixed, unobserved inputs affecting the choices of the variable inputs and output
levels.
Todd and Wolpin (2003) discuss production functions for cognitive achievement and point out that the inclusion of proxy variables like income and prices
for unobserved inputs could lead to more biased measures of the impacts of the
observable inputs than an empirical approach that excludes these proxy variables (see, also, Wolpin, 1997). They discuss various approaches one might use
when not all of the relevant inputs can be observed and assumptions needed for
these approaches to obtain asymptotically unbiased estimates of the marginal
effects of the observed inputs. A major conclusion of their study is that instrumental variables approaches will be unlikely to resolve problems arising from
omitted inputs in the production function. This happens because the omitted
inputs are chosen by the families and so would typically be correlated with the
observed inputs. In this situation, any instrument that has power to predict
5
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the observed input should also predict the unobserved inputs. It could not be
a valid instrument.

3

Preliminary Modeling Issues

A common shortcoming of the studies discussed above is their failure to provide an exact link between the theoretical model and the specification of the
empirical model. In this section we fill in that gap. In the subsequent section
we use the results from this analysis to specify and interpret feasible empirical specifications of health production functions that are consistent with a
theoretical model of household utility optimization. Throughout most of the
analysis in this and the subsequent section, we assume that there are only two
purchased inputs used in the health production function, X and Z, and that
utility only depends on the amount of health produced by the household, H,
and the consumption of a composite commodity C. We extend the analysis
to the general case where the are multiple observed and unobserved inputs in
section 4.4.
Let the function H = F (X, Z) be a household’s health production function. The standard demand functions for the two health inputs are given
by X(pX , pZ , pC , I) and Z(pX , pZ , pC , I) where the p’s are the prices of the
three purchased goods and I is exogenously determined income. We assume
that one could estimate nonparametrically the two demand functions and the
health production function F (X, Z) if the health outcome H, the two inputs
X and Z, the prices of the three goods, and exogenous income I were observed
by the researcher. Since prices and incomes do not enter the production function directly, they are potential candidates to use as instrumental variables to
control for the possible endogeneity of X and Z. The problem we want to

6
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address is what one might be able to learn about the effect of X on H when
there is only information on H, the prices, income, and the quantity of the
input X. That is, the levels of the input Z and the consumption goods C are
not observed.
A seemingly obvious approach would be to substitute the demand function
for Z into the production function and then estimate this form of the “hybrid”
production function. This demand function, by definition, will depend on the
household’s preferences and the form of the health production function. This
approach, however, will in general result in an unidentified model2 . To see this,
substitute the demand function for the unobserved input into the production
function. This yields H = F (X, Z(pX , pZ , pC , I)). When the form of the
demand function is unknown, this becomes some general function of observed
inputs, prices, and income: H = G(X, pX , pZ , pC , I).
Since X depends on exactly the same set of variables determining Z, (pX ,
pZ , pC , I), there is an exact functional relationship among the five arguments
in the function G(·). A nonparametric model for estimating the function G
could admit almost any estimate of the effect of X on H through the function
G by offsetting changes in the impacts of pX , pZ , pC , and I on H. This
nonparametric expression of an identification problem is similar to perfect
multicollinearity in a linear regression model3 . Like in the linear regression
2

This might not be an issue if one can impose the exact functional form of the health
production function F (X, Z) and has precise information about the functional forms for
the demand function Z(pX , pZ , pC , I). Identification here would come from functional form
assumptions.
3
The function F (·) does contain some separability restrictions that are not imposed on
a general function like G(·). However, given the nonidentification result discussed above, it
will be impossible to exploit these separability restrictions to uncover the marginal effect
of X. For example, instead of the function H = F (X, Z(p, I)) one can always substitute
an observationally equivalent function H = F (X, (Z(p, I))) + φ(X) − φ(X(p, I)) for any
function φ(·), where X(p, I) is the true demand function for X. Since φ(·) is arbitrary one
can estimate any effect of X on H while satisfying the separability restrictions.
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model, this identification problem can only be overcome by the imposition of
some, hopefully valid, set of constraints. Economic theory, however, provides
little guidance for the types of constraints one might impose in order to obtain
the true marginal impact of the input X on the health outcome.
This non-identification problem is distinct from the endogeneity of inputs
issue arising from unobservable productivity in the industrial organization literature on estimating production functions. That literature explores structural approaches to control for time varying productivity differentials that are
not due to variations in optimally chosen unobserved inputs4 . Here, all inputs, both observed and unobserved, are choice variables in the individual
optimization problem. The key issue here arises because variations in the observed input X, even under random experimental assignment, typically will
be associated with variations in the choice of the unobserved input Z.
Rosenzweig and Schultz’s (1983) analysis of the hybrid production function differs from the one presented here by its exclusion of the price of the
observed input (pX ) as a determinant of the health outcome. In general this
would be valid only when the unconditional demand for Z does not depend
on pX . Variations in the observed input X would then arise from variations in
pX , which would not be perfectly determined by variations in pZ , pC , and I.
The Rosenzweig and Schultz formulation for the hybrid production function
could more generally be derived when all households face the same price pX .
But in this case, there would be no variation in the input X that did not arise
from variations in pZ , pC , and I, resulting again in a non-identified specification. Without strong and mostly ad hoc assumptions, the form of the hybrid
4

The control-function approaches suggested in Olley and Pakes(1996), Levinsohn and
Petrin(2003), and Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer(2006), for example, would not be feasible
when the ”productivity shock” is itself a chosen input.
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production function discussed by Rosenzweig and Schultz cannot be derived
from a standard model of utility maximization or used to uncover empirically
the impacts of observed health inputs.
The conditional demand function approach discussed in Liu et al (2009)
can overcome the basic identification issue inherent in the unrestricted form of
the hybrid production function G. In particular, consider the demand function
for the unobserved input Z conditional on the optimally chosen level of the
observed input X. Using standard rationed demand analysis, this conditional
function can be written as Z = qz (pC , pZ , I ∗ , X), where I ∗ = I − pX X is the
amount of income the household has left to allocate between the consumption
good C and the unobserved input Z. In general, the conditional demand for
Z will depend on the amount of X chosen by the household even holding the
level of I ∗ fixed. Substituting this constrained demand for Z into the true
production function yields H = F (X, qz (pC , pZ , I ∗ , X)). Without assumptions
on the form of the function qz (·), the estimable conditional hybrid production
function becomes H = GC (X, pC , pZ , I ∗ ). In this situation, the effect of X
on H, through the function GC and conditional on pC , pZ , and I ∗ , should be
nonparametrically identified.
It is crucial that one conditions on the value of I ∗ instead of its components in order for this particular effect of X to be identified. The estimate
of the partial effect of X on H obtained through the conditional hybrid production function GC , however, does not have a simple and straightforward
interpretation. In the next section we derive interpretations of this type of
effect.

9
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4

Basic Model

We begin this section with a detailed analysis of the case where there is only
one observed input and one unobserved input to the household production
function. The setup, intuition and analytic derivations for this simple case
carry over to the multidimensional case. In the last subsection we extend the
analysis to situations with multiple inputs, and the appendix contains complete
derivations when there are multidimensional unobserved and observed inputs.

4.1

Preferences and Technology

Assume consumers derive utility U from health H and some other consumption
goods C. For simplicity, H and C are assumed to be one-dimensional. Health
is produced with several inputs. We denote as X inputs which are observed
and as Z the unobserved inputs. Assume preferences are given by a general
utility function
U = U (C, H; τ ),

(1)

where τ is an arbitrary vector of household-specific taste parameters. The
household health production is given by a function F with standard properties
H = F (X, Z; ρ),

(2)

where ρ represents productivity parameters that could vary from household to
household5 . The household budget constraint is:
pX X + pC C + pZ Z = I.
5

(3)

The taste (τ ) and productivity (ρ) parameters do not affect the comparative static
analysis presented below, so we often drop them in the derivations to save notation. They
are, however, crucial determinants of the household’s optimal choices. In empirical analyses
the presence of these unobserved preference and productivity parameters means that all
observed household inputs must be treated as endogenous variables.

10
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Throughout we consider an interior solution and assume that the corresponding second order conditions are satisfied.
As a straightforward extension, one can interpret this static optimization
formulation as part of a dynamic optimization model with two stage budgeting.
To see this explicitly, one can write the utility function as
U = U (C, H; τ ) = W (Ct , Ht−1 , Ht , τ1t ) +

1
V (Ht , τ2t , Ωt )
1+β

(4)

where Ht−1 is the individual’s health when entering the current period. It is not
a contemporaneous choice variable. W (.) represents the current period utility
function that depends on current consumption, the health stock inherited from
the previous period, the amount of health stock at the end of the period and
possibly a subset of the original taste parameters τ . V (.) is the expected
maximal value of future utility that the household will receive from the next
period onwards, discounted at rate β. It includes the information set available
to the household at time period t, Ωt . Income, I, in this instance should
be interpreted as the household’s optimal expenditure level in time period t.
The household’s technology parameters in the production function, ρ, can also
depend upon the the level of the inherited capital stock.

4.2

Interpreting Estimated Effects of Observed Inputs

Consider the following econometric problem. We would like to estimate the
marginal product of input X on health production:

∂F
.
∂X

The information

available is structured in the following way. The levels of H and X are observed; prices pX , pC , and pZ are observed. Income I is observed. The levels
of other goods C and the health input Z are not observed. Our research goal
is to understand which effects we are able to estimate and whether we can
use these to place informative bounds on the marginal effects of the observed
11
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health inputs.
The estimated effect of the observed input X on a health measure H when
conditioning on an arbitrary set of controls Y would measure:
dH
dX
Here

dZ
dX Y

=
Y

∂F
∂F dZ
+
∂X ∂Z dX

(5)
Y

is the derivative which indicates the change in the unobserved

inputs Z when X changes by dX given the set of control variables Y . We
assume that one is interested in uncovering

∂F
,
∂X

so the second term

∂F dZ
∂Z dX Y

can be considered the bias in estimating the marginal effect of X when Z is
not observed.
Throughout our analysis we assume that the data are rich enough so that
individual level heterogeneity parameters that are fixed for a given individual
(denoted by ρ and τ in the previous section) can be perfectly controlled for
by an appropriate (potentially non-parametric) estimation technique. For example, this could be the case when one has the data on the same individual
facing different prices pX and observed consuming X and X + dX. All the
results we derive here apply at each point of the individual level heterogeneity parameters (ρ0 , τ0 ): e.g. in formula (5) above all partial derivatives are
evaluated at the point (X0 , Z0 ) which is the optimal choice for the individual
with individual heterogeneity parameters (ρ0 , τ0 ) at particular levels of prices
pX , pZ , pC and income I. With this in mind, we omit (ρ0 , τ0 ) from all formulae
to simplify notation.6
The bias term

∂F dZ
∂Z dX Y

in (5) arises from an individual’s optimal choice of

unobserved production input Z in response to the changes in prices and income
that bring about the change in the optimal choice of observed production
6

One simulation discussed in Section 7 has no unobserved heterogeneity, and it demonstrates that the bias term is important even when one can fit perfectly all observed health
outcomes.

12

4.2 Interpreting Estimated Effects of Observed Inputs 4 BASIC MODEL

input X. Instrumental variable approaches, which are useful to deal with
unobserved heterogeneity due to omitted variables fixed at the individual level,
are likely to be invalid to deal with this bias due to the unobservability of the
optimally chosen variables Z. As we show below, any factor that changes
the optimal choice of X is likely to involve a concurrent change in unobserved
optimally chosen unobserved variables Z rendering all potential candidates for
instruments invalid.
A major issue for an empirical analysis of the effect of X on H is the
choice of an appropriate set of controls Y to minimize the “bias term” in
(5),

∂F dZ
.
∂Z dX Y =const

As we argued above, using all available information Y =

(pC , pZ , pX , I) results in an unidentified model, as X itself is fully explained by
those same variables. One needs to put restrictions on the set of conditioning
variables to obtain an identified econometric model. Once effects are identified,
one can provide an economic interpretation of the estimable effect of X on H.
Using the conditional demand function for the unobserved input discussed
above, consider the following optimization problem conditional on the level of
observed input X:
max U (C, F (X, Z))
C,Z

s.t. pC C + pZ Z = I ∗ ≡ I − pX X

(6)

The conditional demand function for unobserved health input Z associated
with this problem is:
Z = qZ (pC , pZ , I − pX X, X)

(7)

We assume that the data are rich enough so that we observe relevant variations
in X while holding total expenditure on other goods C and unobserved input
Z, I ∗ = I − pX X, constant. Then, if we regress the observed health level H on
the observed level of health input X (which does not enter the utility function
13
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directly) and the total expenditures on all goods other than X, I ∗ , (controlling
for prices pZ , pC ) we would estimate the following effect7 :
dH
dX

=
I ∗ =I−pX X=const

∂F dZ
∂F
+
∂X ∂Z dX

(8)
I ∗ =I−pX X=const

The estimated effect is the sum of the effect of interest, the marginal product
of input X in health production

∂F
,
∂X

as well as a bias term related to the fact

that as we change the level of input X the individual might change the level of
unobserved health input Z, even when prices pZ and pC and total expenditures
on C and Z stay constant, i.e.

∂F dZ
8
.
∂Z dX I ∗ =I−pX X

The key question we ask is what is the direction and size of the bias. Assuming that both the observed and unobserved inputs have positive marginal
products, the estimated effect will be biased in the direction towards zero
(negatively biased) whenever the derivative of the conditional demand for Z
with respect to the observed input X is negative. To examine whether this
would be the case, we need to compute how the unobservable input Z changes
when we change the observed input X holding the combined expenditure on Z
and C fixed,

dZ
.
dX I ∗ =I−pX X=const

That is, we need to understand the derivative

of the conditional demand function Z = qZ (pC , pZ , I ∗ , X) with respect to the
observed input X holding I ∗ fixed. Theorem 1 provides one possible answer
to this question
Theorem 1 Suppose health H and other goods C are normal goods and the
degree of complementarity in health production between the beneficial observed
input X and the beneficial unobserved input Z is sufficiently small (the cross
derivative FZX is small if positive or negative: i.e. the increase in one of the
This effect is identified by variations in X induced by changes in px and I that leave I ∗
constant.
8
The set of controls Y is this case is: (pZ , pC , I ∗ )
7
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inputs lowers the marginal effect of the other or barely increases it).9 Then the
regression of observed health H on the observed health input X holding prices
pC and pZ and total expenditure on C and Z (I ∗ = I − pX X) constant, would
underestimate the true value of the marginal product of X in health production.
The estimable effect of the productive input might even be negative.
The Appendix section 9.1 contains a complete derivation of results for a
wide set of cases and the interpretations for other effects estimated by a hybrid
production model. Here we outline the main result for Theorem 1. The key
equation describing the change in the demand for the unobserved input due
to a change in the observed input holding I ∗ constant is:




dZ
UH FZ2 FX ∂
UC
FZX
Bias = Bias1 = FZ
=
log
−
dX
∆
∂H
UH
FZ FX

(9)

The partial derivative with respect to H of the term in parentheses will be
positive whenever C is a normal good10 , and ∆ is negative by the second
order conditions. One’s ability to unambiguously sign the overall bias therefore
depends on the substitutability of the two inputs in producing H. If both X
and Z are beneficial inputs and the two inputs are substitutes or only weak
complements, then the conditional demand for Z will fall with an increase in
X. From (8), this implies that the identified effect of X on Z will underestimate the true marginal impact of a beneficial input X.
9

Theorem 1 considers one possible set of conditions under which we can derive an informative bound for the marginal product of an observed input X. In Theorem 2 we derive
necessary and sufficient conditions that do not require knowledge about substitutability between X and Z but instead rely upon some information about the behavior of consumption
choice C in response to a change
 in X.
UC
∂
∗
C
log U
= −ηC∗ 1−s
In particular, ∂H
H , where CC is the compensated own price
H
CC
elasticity, ηC is the income elasticity of demand for good C and sC is the share of income
spent on C. This term will be large when the income elasticity for the consumption good is
high and also when the compensated own price elasticity for the C is small. See Lemma 1
in Appendix 10.2.
10
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Intuitively, an increase in the observed beneficial health input X increases
the level of health H if Z is kept constant. Such an increase in H can
be thought of as an increase in health endowment in the conditional (on
X) demand system11 .

Since consumption is a normal good, this endow-

ment/“income” increase would tend to be partially reallocated to an increase
in consumption C, attenuating the potential increase in H 12 . This effect is
represented by the first term inside the brackets in equation (9).
If the change in X makes Z less productive (FZX < 0), then this reallocation towards consumption would be reinforced because the shadow price of
health,

pZ
,
FZ (X,Z)

would rise with the increase in X. The income and substitution

effects operate in the same direction. This substitution effect is represented
by the second term inside the brackets in equation (9). In fact, if this second
term is strong enough, the beneficial input X might even appear to be harmful in estimation13 . When the increase in X increases the marginal product
of Z (FZX > 0), the income effect (due to higher endowment of health) and
substitution effect (due to fall in the shadow price of health) work in opposite
directions and the sign of the bias cannot be determined.
One can also sign this bias term in the case when X and/or Z are harmful, but have no direct impact on utility (e.g. X may be dangerous working
conditions for which the person is compensated, so that pX < 0)14 . The sign
11

Due to an increase in X by dX health endowment would rise to H1 = F (X + dX, Z).
In this case as total spending I ∗ on C and Z is kept constant, an increase in C implies
a decrease in Z when pZ > 0 (and hence FZ > 0) and an increase in Z when pZ < 0 (and
hence FZ < 0). Hence the optimal choice of health would be H2 = F (X + dX, Z + dZ) <
H1 = F (X + dX, Z).
13
This finding parallels the famous Peltzman (1975) argument about the impact of mandatory seatbelt laws on automobile accidents. In this argument, mandatory seatbelt use (an
exogenous increase in the beneficial input X) could result in a perceived, dramatic decline
in the marginal product of safe driving and lead to a decline in safe driving (unobserved Z).
That decline could be so large that the total incidence of accidents could increase after the
introduction of the law.
14
However, in the case of harmful health inputs, a more relevant assumption would be that
12
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of this term does not depend on the sign of FZ . When the observed input X
adversely affects health then the bias will be positive provided the term

FZX
FX FZ

is negative or small if positive. Thus, we establish the following:
Corollary 1 Suppose health H and other goods C are normal goods. Assume
the observed health input X and the unobserved health input Z have no direct
effect on utility. Suppose that

FZX
FZ FX

< 0 or small if positive. Then the re-

gression of observed health H on observed health input X holding prices pC , pZ
and total expenditure on C and Z (I ∗ = I − pX X) constant, would underestimate the true value of the marginal product of a beneficial health input X and
overestimate the marginal product of a harmful health input X (underestimate
the adverse impact). The bias may be large enough so that the estimated effect
would be opposite in sign to the true marginal effect of X.
The interpretation of the condition

FZX
FZ FX

< 0 is quite straightforward. In

the case when both X and Z are beneficial inputs it means that FZX < 0, i.e.
an increase in one of the inputs decreases the marginal effect of the other input.
The same condition holds in the case when both X and Z are harmful. The
intuitive interpretation will be different though. Suppose that X is smoking
and Z is illegal drug use, then FZX < 0 would mean that the increase in
smoking raises the marginal damage from illegal drug use. When one of the
two inputs is beneficial and the other harmful, then the relevant condition for
the bound to hold is FZX > 0, i.e., the increase in the amount of beneficial
input (e.g. jogging) decreases the marginal damage of the harmful input (e.g.
smoking).
These substitutability conditions illustrate a one possible set of sufficient
those inputs could also affect utility directly, e.g. an individual consumes alcohol because
he receives utility from it despite the fact that it is bad for her health. We discuss this
extension in the appendix.

17
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conditions needed to characterize the relation between the actual marginal
product and the estimable impact of observed health input. One can instead
use the budget constraint in consumer problem (6) to provide a necessary and
sufficient condition for the estimated effect to provide an informative bound
for the true marginal product of observed input X. This involves understanding how consumption C changes in response to changes in X. Theorem 2
summarizes our findings:
Theorem 2 Consider the regression of observed health H on the observed
health input X holding prices pC and pZ and total expenditure on C and Z
(I ∗ = I − pX X) constant.
i. Suppose in response to the increase in the observed input X the choice
of consumption good C increases: dC > 0. This is a necessary and sufficient
condition for the estimated effect of observed input X to be lower than its true
marginal product.
ii. dC < 0 is a necessary and sufficient condition for the estimated effect
of observed input X to be an upper bound for its true marginal product.
Proof: This is a special case of Theorem 5 (proved below), for the singledimensional X and Z case. 

This result does not depend upon substitutability patterns between observed (X) and unobserved (Z) inputs, nor does it require any assumptions
about the sign of the marginal products of X or Z. Further this result does
not depend upon consumption C or health H being a normal good. This flexibility comes at a cost. In Theorem 2 one imposes a restriction not on the
model fundamentals but rather on the optimal choice of an endogenous variable (consumption good). From a practical perspective, however, researchers
18
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might find it easier to verify whether this assumption holds. Strictly speaking,
the budget constraint logic behind Theorem 2 does not require Z or X to
be single-dimensional. In section 5, where we analyze the multidimensional
inputs case, we discuss a multidimensional extension of Theorem 2.
To summarize, to obtain an identified model in the case when some inputs in the health production function are unobserved one can estimate the
following regression model:
H = F (X, Z(pC , pZ , I − pX X, X, ρ, τ ), ρ)
≡ h(X, pC , pZ , I − pX X, ρ, τ ).

(10)

As implied by economic theory, the regression function h(·) should contain all
of the observed health inputs, the prices of all the unobserved health inputs
and pure consumption goods, and the income the household has to allocate
after it purchases the observed health inputs15 . Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
describe conditions when the estimated effect

∂h
∂X

is likely to be a lower bound

for the true marginal effect of the observed input X.
Unlike the attenuation bias one finds for measurement error problems in
empirical models, the attenuation bias we derive here follows solely from economic theory. The bias arises from a researcher’s uncertainty about the actual
amount of the unobserved input Z used by the household. This theoretical
result provides a “bound” when interpreting a correctly specified hybrid production function when one does not “include” a relevant health input but
does account for all other relevant factors, including taste and productivity
shifters. It provides the theoretical underpinnings for the specification and
interpretation of the empirical hybrid health production function.
Note that our empirical specification differs from the ones suggested in the
15
Since the theoretical hybrid production function depends upon unobserved tastes and
productivities (τ and ρ), in the empirical analysis all observed household inputs should be
treated as endogenous.
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literature. Todd and Wolpin (2003) argued that including income as a proxy
for omitted inputs is likely to confound the estimates of the effects of observed
inputs. We argue, however, that a properly adjusted income measure should
always be included in the regression for the estimated effects to have meaningful economic interpretations. Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) suggest dropping
the prices of included inputs pX , but this also results in a specification incompatible with economic theory unless one is willing to believe quite restrictive
forms for the demand function for input Z.

4.3

Conditioning on Consumption of Non-health Inputs.

A natural question in light of the downward bias result discussed above is
whether one should control for the observable part of the consumption vector
C, which does not affect health production function per se. In the Appendix
section 10.5 we investigate this issue. Though the general direction is ambiguous, one might be able to reduce the bias by controlling for such inputs in
some plausible cases. This would provide a more informative bound for the
true marginal effect. Theorem 3 summarizes this discussion:
Theorem 3 Assume that the observed health input X has no direct effect on
utility. Further assume that health H does not affect the marginal rate of


UW
∂
substitution between two pure consumption goods C and W : ∂H log UC = 0.
(This is true when consumption goods C and W are weakly separable from
health in the utility function). Controlling for W in the estimation of the
hybrid health production function would result in a smaller bias (in absolute
value) for the estimated marginal product of observed health input X.
Theorem 3 can provide information about the true direction of the marginal
effect of X and the type of bound one estimates. If the estimated effect is
20
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positive and larger than the estimate without controlling for W , then the true
impact of X is positive and one has uncovered a (more informative) lower
bound for its magnitude. Similarly, if the estimated effect is negative and
lower than the estimate without controlling for W , then the true impact is
negative and it provides a lower bound on X 0 s detrimental impact. If one
has a priori information on the direction of the true marginal effect of X, the
bias reduction described in Theorem 3 can allow one to determine whether the
estimated effect is an upper or lower bound. Unlike Theorem 1, this result does
not require any knowledge about the substitution patterns in the production
function.
To see more intuitively the rationale behind this result, suppose we could
observe and control for all of the household’s pure consumption goods. Then,
all remaining income in I ∗ would be spent on the unobserved input. A nonparametric specification of the regression model would control exactly for
Z = I ∗ /pZ , and there would be no bias from the “omitted input” in the estimation of the effect of the observed input X on health16 . When we can control
for only a subset of the pure consumption goods, we are able to restrict somewhat the possible levels for the expenditure on the unobserved input. And
when the marginal rate of substitution between the two pure consumption
goods is unrelated to the level of the health output (and consequently to the
level of the observed health input), the remaining budget set shrinks without
inducing a relative shift between the two consumption goods that is related
directly to health. This allows one to obtain a tighter bound without changing
the direction of the bias.
16
This is similar to an approach used in the industrial organization literature, e.g., Olley
and Pakes(1996), where one conditions on investment demand to hold constant the unobserved firm fixed effect when estimating production function parameters.

21

4.4 Multidimensional Inputs

4 BASIC MODEL

To summarize, one cannot estimate the true marginal product of an observed health input X when some essential health inputs are unobserved.
However, one may be able to bring external information to bear and uncover
informative bounds using the approaches we outlined above as described in
Theorems 1, 2, and 3. If anything, it is crucial to include the prices of omitted
inputs and consumption goods in the regression model to obtain an econometric specification consistent with economic theory. The failure to adjust
income properly and include it as a regressor in the hybrid production function makes it nearly impossible to interpret estimated effects and to assess how
they might differ from marginal effects on health production. Controlling for
the consumption of other goods (not necessarily health inputs) can reduce the
size of the bias and make the bound more informative.

4.4

Multidimensional Inputs

The extension to the case of multiple observed inputs X = (x1 , ..., xN )0 with
a single unobserved input Z = (z1 ) is nearly identical to the analytic results
derived above. When there are multiple unobserved inputs Z = (z1 , ..., zK )0 ,
however, an increase in an observed input xi could impact the marginal rates
of technical substitution among the unobserved inputs Z. This could lead to
increases in the demand for some of the unobserved inputs and decreases in
the demands for others. Consequently, even if all observed inputs are pairwise
substitutes with each of the unobserved inputs, there could be an increase
in the demand for some unobserved input due to an increase in an observed
input. Substitutability of the inputs in this situation would not be sufficient
for the estimable effect of the observed input to provide an informative bound.
However, if there is in addition weak separability of the unobserved inputs
in the production process, then the estimable effects do provide informative
22
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bounds. We summarize our findings in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 Suppose health H and other goods C are normal goods. Assume that unobserved health inputs Z = (z1 , ..., zK )0 are weakly separable in
production from observed health inputs X = (x1 , ..., xN )0 : H = F (X, Z) ≡
Φ(X, g(Z)). Assume that health inputs X and Z have no direct effect on utility. Consider running a regression of observed health H on the observed health
input xi holding constant other observed health inputs x−i , prices pC and pZ ,
and total expenditure on C and Z (I ∗ = I − p0X X).
• If the health input xi is beneficial and the degree of complementarity between xi and Z is sufficiently small (the cross derivative Φgxi is small if
positive or negative) then the beneficial effect of xi estimated in the regression above would be lower than the true value of the marginal product
of xi in health production. The estimable effect of the productive input
might even be negative.
• If the health input xi is harmful and the degree of substitutability between
xi and Z is sufficiently small (the cross derivative Φgxi is positive or
small in absolute value if negative) then the effect of xi estimated in
the regression above would be higher than the true value of the marginal
product of xi in health production (i.e., the adverse effect of xi would be
underestimated). The estimable effect of the harmful input might even
be positive.
Proof: In the Appendix 9.1 we show that in the case when health inputs
X and Z have no direct effect on utility the total bias is given by:
 

∂
UC
Bias = UH
log
FZ 0 ∆−1 FZ Fxi − UH FZ 0 ∆−1 FZxi
∂H
UH
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The first term in this bias is always nonpositive since FZ 0 ∆−1 FZ ≤ 0 due to
h  i
∂
the second order conditions, and ∂H log UUHC
≥ 0 whenever consumption
and health are normal goods (see Technical Lemma).
Under the separability assumption we can write the second term as:

UH FZ 0 ∆−1 FZxi = UH Φg Φgxi GZ 0 ∆−1 GZ .

(12)

As before GZ 0 ∆−1 GZ ≤ 0 since ∆ is a negative semidefinite matrix. Thus,
the contribution of this term to the bias is opposite in sign to Φgxi . If xi is a
beneficial health input, Fxi > 0, then the Bias will be negative provided Φgxi
is negative or positive but sufficiently small: i.e. xi and the unobserved health
inputs (in the aggregate) are substitutes or the degree of complementarity is
not strong. If xi is a detrimental health input, Fxi < 0, then the Bias will be
positive provided Φgxi is positive or negative but not large in absolute value. 

The intuition behind these results is nearly identical to that outlined in
the one-dimensional case in our discussions of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1.
An increase in health H due to an increase in some beneficial health input xi
can be thought of as an increase in health endowment in the conditional on
X demand framework. Facing such an increase in real income, an individual
would rationally spend some of that higher health endowment on the (normal)
consumption good C. Thus, the observed increase in health H will be lower
than suggested by the pure increase in xi , provided the increase in xi does not
reduce the shadow price of health by a large amount..
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Consumption behavior and sign of the bias
in the multidimensional case.

As in the single unobserved input case discussed in Theorem 2, one can use
knowledge of how consumption C would change in the conditional on X demand function, in response to an increase in an observed input by the amount
dxi to establish whether or not the estimable effect of an observed input provides a directional bound on its true marginal product. The only condition we
require is that unobserved inputs Z = (z1 , ..., zK ) do not have direct effects on
utility (i.e., xi can affect utility directly but the zk ’s cannot).
In this case consumer optimization problem (6) admits the following equivalent restatement with the help of a cost function:
max U (C, X, H)
C,Z

(13)

s.t. pC C + K(X, H) = I ∗ ≡ I − p0X X
where K(X, H) is a cost function for household production holding the observed inputs X fixed. It is a solution the following problem:
min p0Z Z
Z

(14)

s.t. F (X, Z) = H
This approach allows to effectively reduce the conditional on X multidimensional problem in C and Z to a two-dimensional choice of C and H (conditional
on X).
Now consider changing one of the observed health inputs xi by dxi while
holding other observed inputs x−i , prices of consumption and unobserved inputs (pC , pZ ) and income in conditional demand problem I ∗ constant. Totally
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differentiating the budget constraint we get:
pC dC + Kxi dxi + KH dH = 0

(15)

From the envelope theorem we have that: KH = λH and Kxi = −λH Fxi
where λH > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier from the cost minimization problem.
Thus, we obtain:
F xi −

pC dC
dH
=
dxi
λH dxi

(16)

This equation allows us to establish the necessary and sufficient condition on
the estimated effect of health

dH
dxi

to be lower or upper bound for the true

marginal product of xi : Fxi . This establishes the following result which is
analogous to Theorem 2 discussed in Section 3 above.
Theorem 5 Assume that observed and unobserved health inputs are multidimensional. Further assume that unobserved health inputs Z have no direct
utility effects. Consider the regression of observed health H on the observed
health inputs X = (x1 , ..., xN ) holding prices pC and pZ and total expenditure
on C and Z (I ∗ = I − p0X X) constant.
i. Suppose in response to the increase in one observed input xi , while
keeping other observed inputs x−i constant, the choice of consumption good
C increases: dC > 0. This is a necessary and sufficient condition for the
estimated effect of observed input xi to be lower than its true marginal product
F xi .
ii. Similarly dC < 0 is a necessary and sufficient condition for the estimated effect of observed input xi to be an upper bound for its true marginal
product.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. If consumption were to
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increase following the change dxi , then aggregate spending on the unobserved
K
P
inputs Z would decline (since I ∗ is held constant):
pzk dzk < 0. The total
k=1

effect on health H from an increase in xi would be the sum of main effect
of xi , Fxi dxi , and the combined responses due to the change in unobserved
K
P
inputs Z: dH = Fxi dxi +
Fzk dzk . From the cost minimization problem we
k=1

know that at the optimal choice of unobserved health inputs Z their marginal
product are proportional to their prices: pzk = λH Fzk , ∀k = 1, ..., K (with the
Lagrange multiplier λH being the proportionality factor). Hence lower overall
spending on Z would imply that the contribution of changes in Z to the total
K
P
effect on health H would be negative:
Fzk dzk < 0.
k=1

Note that this derivation does not require any additional assumptions on
the substitutability between X and Z, nor does it require consumption C or
health H to be normal goods. Health inputs X and Z could be either beneficial
or harmful. We do require that unobserved health inputs Z do not have direct
effects on utility, because this condition is needed to reduce a multidimensional
problem in C and Z to a choice of C and H via the cost function K(X, H).
The derivation above implicitly assumes that consumption good C is onedimensional. If there were multiple consumption goods C = (c1 , ..., cM ), one
could investigate empirically the direction of the bias under the following additional assumption. Suppose consumption goods C are separable from the
inputs X in the utility function: U (Q(c1 ...cM ), X, H). If the conditional demand for any consumption good cm increased(decreased) in response to an
increase dxi , then the estimable effect of Xi in the hybrid health production
function would be a lower (upper) bound for its true marginal effect.
To sum up, to interpret the estimates of the hybrid production function as
relevant economic quantities a researcher must bring additional information
about the underlying economic problem. Theorem 4 in the previous section
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presents a set of conditions when one understands well the technological relations (in particular substitution patterns) between observed and unobserved
health inputs. This information, for example, might come from medical literature. In other situations the researcher might be able to justify a separability
assumption like the one just described. In that case one could rely on Theorem
5 and empirically determine whether she/he has estimated a upper or lower
bound on the true marginal effect of the observed health input by looking
at observed changes in endogenous variables (e.g. some consumption goods).
Our main point is more general than the specific assumptions we mention
in this and previous sections. A failure to impose and test these conditions,
or to establish alternative identifying assumptions of a similar nature, would
yield estimates which cannot be interpreted as the ceteris paribus effects of
household production inputs.

6

Instruments and Experimental Effects.

Suppose, for example, that one specifies the empirical health production function as only a function of a single input X. This misspecified model incorrectly
excludes all terms involving the unobserved inputs Z; these are subsumed in
the “error term.” Since the observed input X is chosen jointly with the unobserved inputs, the error term in this specification usually will be correlated
with the observed input17 . To control for endogeneity bias in the estimation
of the misspecified model, one might consider using variations in variables like
the price of the observed input or an experimental assignment as an instrumental variable. However, as noted by Todd and Wolpin (2003), any determinant
of the observed input typically will also influence the demand for the unob17

Throughout this discussion, we assume that the unobserved taste and productivity
parameters, τ and ρ, are independent of all prices and incomes.
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served input18 , violating one of the requirements for the variable to be a valid
instrument19 . The marginal effect of X will not be identified.
Adding variables like household income and prices of the unobserved inputs typically will also fail to yield interpretable estimates of the effects of the
observed input on health. This happens for two reasons. First, the conditional
demand function for the unobserved input as described in equation (10) depends on income after removing expenditures on the observed input, not total
household income. This specification issue, however, may be not too severe
provided expenditures on the observed input are small.
Second, the correct specification of the hybrid production function also includes the prices of all consumption goods. Unless consumption good prices
are independent of the health input prices and incomes, or perfectly explained
by them, the empirical model will be misspecified. If one uses an instrumental variables approach to control for the endogeneity of the observed inputs
for the estimation, with consumption good and input prices included only as
instruments, then a rejection of the overidentification restrictions would be
indicative of an incorrectly specified empirical model in this instance.
An experimental assignment of the observed input to a random sample
of households also will not provide an asymptotically unbiased estimator of
the marginal effect of X, but it can provide an estimator of the bound of the
18

In some special cases the demand for Z might not depend on the price of the observed
input. Provided all the determinants of the unobserved input, including its price and household income are independent of the price of X, estimation in this instance will be quite
similar to the case of experimental assignment of the input X discussed below. To simplify
this discussion, we also assume the conditions for Theorem 1 to hold are satisfied.
19
In a similar way, government policies and regulations which prescribe a certain level of
consumption of observed input X, e.g. a ban on smoking, would not be valid instruments
since a change in the amount of observed input X consumed (a reduction to zero in the
case of a ban) would, in general, also result in changes in the choices of the unobserved
inputs Z. For example, in the case of smoking ban, people might switch to other stimulants
which substitute for smoking (e.g. chewing tobacco or illegal substances); this would also
contaminate the estimation of the actual marginal effect of smoking on health.
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impact of X described in equation (8). Suppose households perfectly comply
with their experimental assignment of X, where X is provided at zero cost
and the X assignments are made independent of all other factors affecting
household decisions and outcomes (in particular pz , pc , I, and ρ and τ ). Given
X, households will optimally choose the unobserved inputs Z and consumption
goods C to maximize utility, and equation (10) evaluated at px = 0 will be
the correctly specified hybrid production function.
Assume first that there is no individual level heterogeneity in preferences
and health production function (ρ and τ are the same for everybody). In this
case nonparametric regression of H on X controlling for observables (namely
pz , pc , I 20 ) would be able to identify exactly the same bound as presented
in equation (8). In this simplest case the choice of the input Z is exactly
determined by prices pz , pc , income I, and level of observed health input X.
But since different (assigned) values of X imply different values of Z being
chosen even for the same prices and income, the estimated effect of X on H
would be contaminated by associated changes in Z. This yields the same bias
described in Theorem 1 above21 .
In the more realistic case when there is individual level heterogeneity (ρ, τ ),
such a nonparametric regression would identify only some “average” of the
bounds described in (8), where the average is taken with respect to the joint
distribution of ρ and τ . In the case when estimated nonparametric regression
does not condition on prices and income, the average will be taken over the
whole joint distribution of pz , pc , I, and ρ and τ . The bound defined in
Theorems 1 and 2 is identical to the “policy effect” in Heckman(1992) and
In this case I ∗ = I since pX = 0.
This just highlights the fact that the choice of Z depends on the experimentally assigned
value of X, Z = Z(X, I, pz , pc ).
20

21
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discussed by Todd and Wolpin (2003).
In the absence of a random experimental assignment for X, the regression
model needs to include the prices of all consumption goods (not just omitted
health inputs) and the adjusted income, I ∗ . As a result, the estimated effect
of X will be a function of these prices and I ∗ . As discussed above it will be
identical to the estimate from the experimental assignment which conditions on
these variables. Experimental assignment studies usually do not condition on
these prices and incomes and thus are likely to provide estimates of limited use
outside of the population studied under the experiment. Our findings suggest
that experimental assignment estimates could be more widely applicable if one
were to condition on more prices and (adjusted) incomes.
In our simulation exercises below, we present average effects for X at each
value of the observed input X, where we average with respect to the distribution of all prices and incomes that could have given rise to that particular
observed value of X. In general, these conditional distributions will vary with
the level of X, unless the input X is assigned so that it is independent of all
prices and incomes and all unobserved tastes and productivities.

7

Simulations Illustrating the Bounds

Though no finite set of simulations can provide complete information about
the consequences on the estimation of marginal products when one does not
observe all of the relevant inputs to the production function, these simulations
do demonstrate three key implications of the lack of complete information.
First, we show that the bias described in Theorem 1 could be considerable.
Second, we illustrate that including non-health related information into the
estimation of the hybrid production function has the potential to provide a
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more informative bound (Theorem 2). Third, we demonstrate that estimation approaches that either ignore the missing inputs or proxy for them using
household income have the potential to provide severely biased estimates of
the impacts of the observed inputs.
We present three simulations to illustrate how the theoretical bounds on
the marginal products might work in practice. The first simulation allows
for observable heterogeneity across households arising from variations in observable prices and incomes to affect input demands as well as unobserved
to the researcher heterogeneity affecting the health production function. The
second simulation removes all unobserved heterogeneity (unobserved by the
researcher); we use it to illustrate that the biases arise even in an idealized
world. The third simulation mimics a random experimental assignment of the
observed input, where the household can alter its choice of the unobserved
input and consumption goods in response to the experimental assignment. In
each simulation we generate one million observations on prices, incomes and
heterogeneity and solve for each household’s optimal commodity and health
input demands and the resulting health outcomes. We use various approaches
for estimating the “marginal effect” of an observed health input22 .
Suppose the utility function depends on two consumption goods, c1 and
c2 , and health H. It has the following Stone-Geary form:
Ui = (c1i − 3).1 (c2i − 4).5 (Hi − 5).4

(17)

Health is produced by the CES production function
Hi = (ρi x0.75
+ zi0.75 )0.8
i
22

(18)

These simulations cannot be representative, as alternative choices for the data generating processes and parameters described below will yield different “true” impacts and
“estimable” impacts. They only demonstrate the potential issues and solutions we discuss.
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where x and z are the two health inputs and ρi is the heterogeneity known
to the household when it makes its input choices but unmeasured by the
researcher. The budget constraint is given by
px i xi + pc 1i c1i + pc 2i c2i + pz i zi = Ii .

(19)

All prices and incomes follow uniform distributions generated from a fivevariate normal copula23 and are independent of the heterogeneity in the production function, ρ. These functional form assumptions for the utility and
production functions correspond to those specified in Theorems 1 and 2.
When estimating the production functions and hybrid functions, we do
not impose the known functional forms imposed by the above specifications
of the utility and production functions. In all of the “estimations” with these
simulated data, we use a third degree fully-interacted polynomial in the logexplanatory variables as the approximate functional form in the (hybrid) production function. Any interaction term containing a choice variable we treat
as endogenous, using a fully-interacted fourth degree polynomial in the logarithms of the exogenously determined prices and incomes as instruments24 .
The left hand panel in Figure 1 presents the calculated partial derivative
of health with respect to a unit change in the observed health input for the
23

The normal components are correlated at 0.4, except for the component used to generate
pz which has a -0.4 correlation with each of the other four components. Each of the four
prices follow a U(1,2) while incomes follow a U(50,150). The uniform random variables have
correlations of approximately +/-0.38. Unobserved heterogeneity follows a independent
uniform distribution on (1,2) when it is present; otherwise it is fixed at 1.5.
24
In the simulations with no unobserved heterogeneity, for the true production function
and the correctly specified hybrid models, the R2 values are always 0.9967 or larger, revealing that that the third order polynomials approximate well the true functions. For the
incorrectly specified functions, such as the regression of the observed health outcome only
on a polynomial in the observed input or only on a polynomial in the observed input and
income, the R2 values can be as low as 0.7669. The first stage regressions almost always
have reported R2 values of 1.0000 when there is no unobserved heterogeneity, indicating
that the fourth degree polynomials approximate well the true functional forms.
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estimated true production function and three of the correctly specified hybrid
production functions derived above. There is unobserved heterogeneity in
the production function; it impacts all effects presented in Figure 125 . We
construct the average derivative about each value of X using the distribution
of the exogenous prices and incomes around each point26 .
The two overlapping lines at the top of this panel measure the “true” average analytic derivative. One comes from evaluating the analytic formula and
the other from estimating the third order approximation when both inputs
are observed. They do not coincide exceptionally well at the lowest levels of
the observed input due to combined effect of the estimation by instrumental variables and the presence of the unobserved heterogeneity in the health
production function that households take into account when they make their
choices. These lines represent the true effects we would like to measure in an
ideal world. The lowest line in the left panel measures the average effect of X
from the correctly specified hybrid function from equation (10), and it measures the bound on the true marginal effect described in (8). It differs from the
true derivative by the term described in (9). Even though the demand for the
observed input is three times larger than the demand for the unobserved input
(average budget share of 30% versus 10%), the bias is considerable over most
of the range of the observed input27 . We label this the minimum information
bound.
The line just above the lower bound reveals how the bound tightens when
25

The mean effect of the observed input X on health is 0.242(sd: 0.047); the mean effect
of the unobserved input Z is 0.242 (sd:0.073); and the cross derivative is -0.0015(sd: 0.0006).
26
We do this empirically; for each value of X we construct the average of the derivatives in
the range(X-0.5, X+0.5) in the one million observation data set. Since the joint distributions
of these characteristics vary with X, the slopes of the lines in the figures do not measure
how the marginal product of X varies as X increases.
27
The small numbers on the horizontal axis indicate the 5th , 10th , 25th , 50th , 75th , 90th ,
and 95th percentiles of the observed input.

34

7 SIMULATIONS ILLUSTRATING THE BOUNDS

one controls for the demand for a consumption good as discussed in Theorem 2.
It provides a tighter bound. Since its average budget share is low (only 13%),
controlling for it provides little new information. The line closer to the true
average marginal effect line demonstrates the implication of instead controlling
for a good comprising a larger average budget share (47%). Controlling for the
good with a large budget share substantially limits the size of the remaining
budget allocated between the unobserved input and the other consumption
good. In this example it provides a substantively more precise bound.
The right panel of Figure 1 explores less theoretically motivated approaches
for estimating the impact of the observed input on health. The top two lines in
this figure repeat the true average marginal effect line and the least informative bound line from the left panel. The long dashed line measures the average
effect when the empirical production function only depends on the observed
input. Over most of the range it lies further from the true values than the
least informative bound.28 The line with short dashes provides the average
effect when one also includes the log income in the production function specification. This specification supports Todd and Wolpin’s (2003) contention
that including income to capture the missing inputs could lead to more severe
biases.
The dotted line adds the prices of the two consumption goods and the missing input to the specification. It corresponds to Rosenzweig and Schultz’s(1983)
hybrid production function. For this simulation it does yield improvements in
the estimation of the effects of the observed input over the other two misspecified models, but it almost never provides a better estimated average effect
than the least informative bound that we derive. Figure A1 in the appendix
28

While it consistently underestimates the true effect here, for other specifications of the
distributions of the prices and inputs it can instead overestimate the true effect.
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repeats theses graphs for the case when there is no unobserved heterogeneity
in the health production function, and nearly all of the above discussion carries over to this more idealized case. The only significant exception is that the
estimate of the true marginal effect is nearly indistinguishable from the true
calculated effect. This happens because there is no unobserved heterogeneity
so all R2 ’s are nearly identical to 1.00. In summary, these figures reveal that
the bias due to not observing an input can be large and that the bound can be
tightened considerably by incorporating information about non-health related
expenditures. None of the less theoretically motivated estimators provide better estimates of ”effects” than the loosest, minimum information bound model
over most of the range of the observed input.
In Figure 2 we display estimates of the estimated average impacts of the
observed input when the observed health input is experimentally assigned29 .
The left hand panel displays the bounds using correctly specified hybrid models with and without controls for pure consumption goods. The results are
nearly identical to those presented in Figure 1. The amount of bias for the
estimated marginal effect can be fairly substantial and the bias can be reduced
by incorporating non-health related information. The right hand panel displays estimates using econometric models that are standard in the evaluation
of experimental effects. These are exactly the same empirical models examined
in the right hand panel of Figure 1. Because the observed input is assigned
independently of all prices, incomes, and heterogeneities, the joint distribution
of these other health determinants are independent of the assigned input level,
and all of the average effects from using different control variables are identical
at each particular value of X. As discussed in the previous section, the average
29

We randomly reallocate the observed demands for the input X from the model with
heterogeneity used to produce Figure 1 to observations to make these assignments.
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effect for each of these estimators of the experimental effect are equivalent to
the minimum information bound described in equation (8).
It is crucial to recognize that the marginal effects, bounds, and experimental effects presented in Figures 1 and 2 are averages over the joint distribution
of prices and incomes about each point on the X axis. In Figure 3 we demonstrate how these effects change when one uses the experimentally assigned
input X but only considers those individuals with incomes in the lowest quartile and who face prices of the unobserved input in the highest price quartile30 .
This subset of observations contains those who are least likely to choose large
values for the unobserved input. The two solid lines at the top of Figure 3
are true marginal effects calculated by using information on both the observed
and unobserved inputs. The thin solid line repeats the true average marginal
effects from Figure 2, while the thick solid line is the true average marginal
effect for those with low income and high price for the unobserved input. The
true marginal effect for the restricted sample exceeds that for the entire sample
due to the substitutability of inputs imposed by the form of the production
function and the lower choices of the unobserved input for this group. The
lowest line repeats the average minimum information lower bound from the
correctly specified hybrid production model31 , which as we saw in Figure 2
equals the estimated effect obtained when one uses any of the experimental
model estimators and averages over the entire distribution of prices and income.
The two dashed lines (almost completely overlapping) represent the average minimum information bound for those with low income and high prices
for the input Z and the average of the experimental effect for low income and
30
31

The model is estimated using all observations, exactly as was done for Figure 2.
Averaged over the entire distribution of prices and incomes at each point X.
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high price for Z 32 . The last two lines (dashes with dots) are the estimated
bounds from the correctly specified hybrid model with controls for the choice
of the second pure consumption good(c2 ), with the thicker line being the average bound for individuals with low income and high prices and the thinner
line averaging over the entire distribution of incomes and prices as in Figure
2. Even when focusing on this subset of low-income/high pz individuals, conditioning on the “irrelevant” input c2 provides a tighter bound for the true
marginal effect than the bound obtained when one does not include c2 in the
hybrid production function.

8

Summary

This paper demonstrates how one can use economic theory to specify empirical models of household production functions and provide possibly interesting
and useful economic interpretations for effects of inputs estimated using these
correctly specified hybrid production functions. Provided observed and unobserved inputs are not strongly complementary, theoretical analysis reveals
that the estimated effect of an observed productive input would typically yield
a lower bound on the marginal product of the observed input. For a “bad”
observed input (e.g., smoking), the estimated impact would provide a lower
bound on its true, marginal detrimental effect. We also discuss bounds on
the true ceteris paribus marginal effects that use only information on how
consumption would change with an exogenous increase in an observed input.
These bounds follow from theoretical ceteris paribus derivations; they do
not depend upon any assumptions about endogeneity of inputs or the form of
32

For these two experimental effect to differ from the lowest bound estimate, it is necessary
for the estimation with the experimental data to include income and the price of Z as
regressors in the empirical model.
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a statistical model. We further show that one can improve on those bounds
by including seemingly irrelevant information about pure consumption goods,
provided particular separability assumptions for the utility function are reasonable. This also allows one to establish the sign of the bias and determine
whether the estimated effect represents an upper or lower bound on the true
marginal product of the observed input. We demonstrate the potential empirical relevance of these bounds and improvements on them using data generated
by a simple simulation exercise.
The least informative bound that we identify for the marginal effect is
identical to the “policy effect” one would estimate in an experimental setting
holding prices and incomes constant. If the policy effect is the only effect of
interest, then our analysis describes how one can estimate this effect without
needing to rely upon an experimental study. Given the estimated relationship,
it would be straightforward to solve for a “policy effect” in many alternative
environments by integrating over different joint distributions of prices and
incomes. Experimental studies that ignore such characteristics in the estimation would be less informative, unless other target populations face a similar
distribution of prices and incomes to that for the experimental subjects.
The least informative bound, since it is the “policy effect,” would provide
sufficient information in many situations. But a more complete understanding
of how households produce health, education, and other outputs could help
researchers uncover and develop more effective policy tools. Our derivation of
the bounds on the marginal products and how one can improve those bounds
is an essential step in this direction.
We take no stand on whether or not the specific conditions we derive are
likely to hold in practice. Our main point is that unless one is able to come
up with and justify assumptions of this or a similar nature, one cannot claim
39
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that the estimated effects of observed household production inputs provide
any resemblance to their marginal effects. This problem pervades all of the
existing studies of household production including health, child development,
human capital, and educational investments.
To reiterate, our main criticism of the household production literature concerns the interpretation of existing estimates, not necessarily their point values.
Under some conditions33 , the point estimates from correctly specified hybrid
production functions may not differ appreciably from those found in the literature. However, for these estimates to have meaningful economic content,
such as the bounds interpretation we derive, one needs to invoke and justify
additional assumptions about the substitution patterns among observed and
unobserved inputs.
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For example, this could be the case when income effects are small, expenditure on
observed inputs is low, and there is little variability in consumption goods’ prices and prices
of omitted inputs.
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For Online Appendix

10.1

Derivation of the bias

In this section of the appendix we derive an expression for the bias of the
estimated marginal effect of observed inputs X in the most general case when
both X and unobserved input Z have direct effects on utility. One can derive
biases in the case when X and/or Z are affecting only health as special cases of
this problem. We consider the general case when there are multiple observed
and unobserved health inputs: i.e. X = (x1 , ..., xN )0 and Z = (z1 , ..., zK )0 are
vectors. However, for simplicity we assume that consumption is represented by
scalar aggregated consumption good C. The consumer’s problem (conditional
on X) in this case can be written as:
max U (C, X, Z, F (X, Z))
C,Z

(20)

s.t. pC C + p0Z Z = I ∗ = I − p0X X
where pX and pZ are vectors of prices conforming to X and Z respectively.
Expressing C from the budget constraint: C = I R −t0X X −t0Z Z, where tX =
pX
,
pC

tZ =

PZ
,
PC

and I R =

I
,
pC

we can express constrained optimization problem

(20) with respect to C and Z as the following unconstrained optimization with
respect to Z only:
max U (I R − t0X X − t0Z Z, X, Z, F (X, Z))

(21)

Z

Optimality conditions for this problem are:
−tZ UC + (UH FZ + UZ ) = 034
34

Here and in what follows to save space we denote column vector

45

(22)
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∂Z

as FZ and row
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and the following matrix is negative semidefinite:
∆≡

∂
∂Z 0

(−tZ UC + (UH FZ + UZ )) ≤ 0.

(23)

Consider varying the observed input X by vector dX of infinitesimal changes:
dX = (dx1 , dx2 , ..., dxN )0 . To assess the bias, we need to determine the sign of
the change in the unobserved level of input Z, dZ. Totally differentiating first
order condition (22) we obtain:
∂
∂Z 0

(−tZ UC + (FZ UH + UZ )) dZ +

∂
∂X 0

(−tZ UC + (FZ UH + UZ )) dX = 0
(24)

The first term in this sum is ∆dZ where ∆ is negative semidefinite matrix
from (23). The second term can be derived from utility function in (21). Thus
we get:
∆dZ = [tZ UCX 0 + tZ FX 0 UCH − UZX 0 − UZH FX 0 −

(25)

−FZ UHX 0 − FZ FX 0 UHH − UH FZX 0 ]
Expressing price ratios vector tZ from the first order condition (22): tZ =
UH
F
UC Z

+

UZ
UC

and substituting into (25) we get:

∆dZ =

h

1
U U 0
UC Z CX

+

UH
F U 0
UC Z CX

+

UCH
UZ FX 0
UC

+

UCH UH
FZ FX 0 −
UC

(26)

−UZX 0 − UZH FX 0 − FZ UHX 0 − FZ FX 0 UHH − UH FZX 0 ] dX
For the later analysis it is instructive to combine the terms in (26) as:
vector


∂F 0
∂Z

as FZ 0 , matrix

∂2F
∂Z∂X 0

as FZX 0 , etc
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B1 ≡




− UHH FZ FX 0 − UH FZX 0 =
h  i
log UUHC FZ FX 0 − UH FZX 0

UCH UH
UC

∂
= UH ∂H

B2 ≡

10 FOR ONLINE APPENDIX

UH
F U 0
UC Z CX

B3 ≡

B4 ≡

h  i
∂
log UUHC
− FZ UHX 0 = UH FZ ∂X
0

1
U U 0
UC Z CX

UCH
UZ FX 0
UC

− UZX 0 =

∂
−UC ∂X
0

∂
− UZH FX 0 = −UC ∂H





UZ
UC

UZ
UC





FX 0

(27)

(28)

(29)

(30)

When one runs a regression of health outcome H on observed health inputs X, the point estimate for a particular health input Xi would measure:
∂F
∂xi

dZ
+ FZ 0 dx
i

x−i ,I−p0X X

, where

dZ
dxi

x−i ,I−p0X X

represents a vector of changes in

unobserved health inputs Z associated with a change in xi while keeping other
observed health inputs x−i fixed and total income (I − p0X X) spent on consumption C and unobserved health inputs Z constant.
Using our derivation above, the change dZ can be calculated from equations (26)-(30) while setting the i-th element of dX to dxi and the remaining
elements to zero. Denote such a vector of infinitesimal changes as dXi . With
this in mind, the total bias term in this case can be written as:

dZ
BIAS = FZ 0 dx
i

x−i ,I−p0X X

i
= FZ 0 ∆−1 (B1 + B2 + B3 + B4 ) dX
≡
dxi

≡ BIAS1 + BIAS2 + BIAS3 + BIAS4

47
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where35

∂
= UH ∂H

i
BIAS1 ≡ FZ 0 ∆−1 B1 dX
=
dxi
h  i
log UUHC FZ 0 ∆−1 FZ Fxi − UH FZ 0 ∆−1 FZxi

−1

BIAS2 ≡ FZ 0 ∆

i
B2 dX
dxi

−1

= UH FZ 0 ∆

FZ ∂x∂ i

h

∂
i
= −UC FZ 0 ∆−1 ∂H
BIAS4 ≡ FZ 0 ∆−1 B4 dX
dxi



UC
UH

UZ
UC



(34)

F xi

(35)

log

i
BIAS3 ≡ FZ 0 ∆−1 B3 dX
= −UC FZ 0 ∆−1 ∂x∂ i
dxi





(32)

UZ
UC



i

(33)

The first bias term, Bias1 , results from the presence of X and Z in the
production function. The second term Bias2 is present when X also affects
utility function directly but Z is affecting only health production. The third
term Bias3 appears when Z has a direct impact on utility. And the fourth
term is present when both X and Z have direct impacts on utility.
In the special case when X and Z are one dimensional total bias can be
written as:

=

10.2

Bias = Bias1 + Bias2 + Bias3 + Bias4 =
 




UH FZ2 ∂
UC
FZX
UC
∂
log UH − FZ FX + ∆ ∂X log UH +
∆
∂H




∂
∂
+ UZ F∆X FZ ∂H
log UUCZ + UZ∆FZ ∂X
log UUCZ

UH FZ2 FX

(36)

Technical Lemma

Lemma 1 If C is a normal good then

∂
∂H



log UUHC



≥ 0.

Proof: Consider an arbitrary point (C, H). Set the ratio of prices
equal to the ratio of marginal utilities
35

Here we use the fact that FX 0 dXi =

UC
UH

∂F
∂xi dxi

48

pC
pH

at this point. Then this point will

≡ Fxi dxi
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be a solution to the individual utility maximization problem for income level
I = pC C + pH H at these prices.
Consider the following thought experiment: increase income I by some dI
and change the price of C by some dpC in such a way that the individual’s
choice of C does not change but the chosen level of H changes. Taking the
first differential of the demand functions for C and H yields:
0 = dC =

dH =

∂C
∂C
dpC +
dI
∂pC
∂I

∂H
∂H
dI
dpC +
∂pC
∂I

(37)

(38)

Solve for dI from equation (37) and substitute this into (38)
∂H
∂H
dH
=
−
dpC
∂pC
∂I

∂C
∂pC
∂C
∂I

(39)

or, equivalently


H
dH
CC
=
HC − ηH
dpC
pC
ηC

(40)

where the ’s are the (uncompensated) price elasticities of demand and η are
income elasticities.
From the Cournot aggregation condition, sH HC +sC CC +sC = 0, where sC
and sH are the budget shares of C and H, HC = − ssHC (CC + 1). Substituting
this relation into equation (40) yields:



dH
H
sC
ηH
sC
=
−
− CC
+
dpC
pC
sH
ηC
sH
Using the Engel aggregation condition, sH ηH + sC ηC = 1 yields:
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H
CC
H∗CC
dH
=−
sC +
=−
dpC
pC sH
ηC
pC sH η C

(42)

where ∗CC = CC + sC ηC is compensated own price elasticity.
∂
∂H

In the above derivation we kept C constant allowing H to vary, hence




d
log UUHC = dH
log UUHC . Since the ratio of marginal utilities equals the

price ratio at the optimal choice point we obtain:
∂
∂H



dpC
η C sH
UC
d(pC/pH ) pH
=
=
log
=
.
UH
dH pC
dHpC
−∗CC H

(43)

Since the own price compensated elasticity, ∗CC , is negative, the sign of the
expression above is the same as sign of ηC . When C is a normal good, this
term is always positive.


10.3

Health Inputs with Direct Utility Effects

In the main text we considered the case when the health inputs under consideration X = (x1 , ..., xN )0 had no direct impact on utility. In the empirical
analysis often one is concerned with the case when some of the health inputs
are detrimental to health, Fxi < 0 for some i, but individuals still consume
them since they derive utility from them. In this section we allow for the
observed input to have a positive direct effect on utility while having a (potentially negative) effect on health. For example, X could be smoking or binge
drinking.36
In our derivations above we also assumed that unobserved health inputs Z = (z1 , ..., zK )0
have no direct utility effects either. In this section we try to relax this assumption as well.
36
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An individual in this case would maximize the following utility function
U (C, X, F (X, Z; ρ); τ )

(44)

subject to the same budget constrain as above. As before we are interested in
assessing the size of the bias in the estimation of the marginal effects of the
observed inputs X = (x1 , ..., xN ):

∂F dZ
∂Z dXi

I ∗ =I−pX X=const,x−i =const

.

As we show in Appendix 10.1 in this case the bias for the estimated effect
of a particular observed health input xi could be written as:

∂
= UH ∂H

Bias = Bias1 + Bias2 =
h  i
log UUHC FZ 0 ∆−1 FZ Fxi − UH FZ 0 ∆−1 FZxi +
h  i
+UH FZ 0 ∆−1 FZ ∂x∂ i log UUHC

(45)

As discussed above, the first term Bias1 typically37 has the opposite sign to
∂F
.
∂xi

∂F
In the case when xi is a “bad” input ( ∂x
< 0) this term will be positive,
i

and the estimated marginal effect would underestimate the true detrimental
impact of xi or even cause it to appear to be a “good” input.
However, compared to the baseline case we have an additional term in the
total bias that relates to the relative substitutability of xi with pure consump

UC
∂
tion goods C and health H in the utility function: ∂xi log UH .38 In general,
the sign of this term has to be assessed by the researcher on a case by case
basis.
In the case of xi being smoking, for example, the term

∂
∂xi



log

UC
UH



would

37
In the case when Z is one dimensional it suffices to put some restrictions on the degree of
complementarity/substitutability between xi and Z. In the multidimensional case additional
separability conditions have to be imposed to establish unambiguously the direction of the
bias. See Theorems 1 and 3 for more details.
38
As before FZ 0 ∆−1 FZ ≤ 0 due to second order conditions.
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be negative when, as people smoke more, they value health H more (at the
margin) than other consumption goods C, keeping the levels of health and
those consumption goods constant39 . In this case the last term in the bias will
also be positive. The total bias will be positive for a bad input such as smoking,
and estimable effects would still provide a bound on the true marginal effect.
For the case of good input which has a direct effect on utility, the reverse
condition would be needed for the estimable effect to be a bound.
When this assumption is violated then the total bias might still be opposite
in sign to Fxi if the contribution from this term does not dominate Bias1 . In
this case the estimated upper (lower) bound for

∂F
∂xi

∂F
< 0 ( ∂x
> 0) would be
i

more precise. However, in general the sign of the total bias for the estimable
effect cannot be interpreted as a bound without incorporating additional information.
In the case when both the observed and unobserved inputs have dual impacts, there are two additional terms in the bias (see equations (29) and (30)
in Appendix 10.1), which relate to changes in substitutability between pure
consumption goods C and the unobserved inputs Z as consumption goods (i.e.
ignoring Z’s impact on utility through health production) when the levels of
health H and observed inputs X change. In general, the signs of those terms
have to be assessed on a case by case basis. However, if the utility function is
separable in (X, H) and (C, Z), these additional bias terms would equal zero
and the above interpretations would hold.
39

I.e., when xi increases we do not take into account its impact on H through the production function.

52

10.4 Interpretation of Other Estimated Effects
10 FOR ONLINE APPENDIX

10.4

Interpretation of Other Estimated Effects

In the main text we interpreted the effects of observed health input in the
correctly specified hybrid production function in equation (10). In this section
we derive interpretation for estimated “effects” of other explanatory variables,
which are included in regression (10).
The estimable effect of I ∗ measures the derivative of observed health H
with respect to I − p0X X,
∂F ∂Z
∂h
=
∗
∂I
∂Z ∂I ∗

(46)

The effect of adjusted income I ∗ is the combination of the marginal product of
missing input(s) and their (conditional on X) income effects. This effect is not
guaranteed to be positive. In fact, if missing inputs negatively affect health
(e.g. smoking) and are normal goods (conditionally on X) then the estimated
effect of I ∗ might be negative.
Interpretations of the impacts of the prices of other missing inputs can be
simply derived. For example, the effect of the price pZ of unobserved health
inputs Z would measure:
∂h
∂F ∂Z
=
∂pZ
∂Z ∂pZ

(47)

The effect of the price of unobserved non-health input C would measure
∂h
∂F ∂Z
=
∂pC
∂Z ∂pC

(48)

When there is more than one missing health input then those estimable effects
would measure the sum of marginal products of all the unobserved health
inputs each weighted by the price derivative of the conditional demand for it
with respect to the corresponding price.
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Proof of Theorem 2.

In this Appendix section we investigate whether it is better to control for the
observable consumption of non-health production goods in order to minimize
the bias of the estimated marginal product of observed health inputs. For
simplicity consider first the case when the unobserved input Z has no direct
impact on utility.
In particular, we now assume that part of consumption C is observable.
Slightly abusing the notation let C be the consumption input which is not
observable and W be the consumption input which is observable. X is the
observable health input, and Z is the unobservable health input. Consider
estimating the marginal impact of the observable health input X on H controlling for the value of the observable non-health input W . The bias, as
before, can be inferred from:
dH
dX

=
I ∗ =const,W =W ∗

∂F
∂F dZ
+
∂X ∂Z dX

We would like to analyze how the term

(49)
I ∗ =const,W =W ∗

∂F dZ
∂Z dX I ∗ =const

changes depending on

whether or not one controls for W (with I ∗ being different in those two cases).
If one does not control for W , then as X changes both dZ and dW are
potentially non-zero. When we control for W then dW = 0. Without loss of
generality we consider the bias for an arbitrary dW and zero it out as needed.
Since neither X or Z affect utility directly, the individual’s problem in this
case can be written as:
max U (C, W, F (X, Z))

C,Z,W

(50)

s.t. pC C + pW W + pZ Z = I ∗ ≡ I − pX X
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To simplify the derivation normalize pC = 1. Then expressing C from the
budget constraint and substituting it into the objective function we can equivalently rewrite the consumer’s optimization problem as:
max V (Z, W, F (X, Z); I ∗ ) ≡ max U (I ∗ − pW W − pZ Z, W, F (X, Z))
Z,W

Z,W

(51)

The first order conditions can be written as usual:
VW = 0

(52)

VZ + VH FZ = 0
The second order condition in this case requires that the following matrix of
second derivatives is negative semidefinite:



VW W

VW Z + VW H FZ

(VW Z + VW H FZ )0 VZZ + 2VHZ FZ + VHH FZ2 + VH FZZ


≤0

(53)

Consider changing the observable health input X by some amount dX while
keeping I ∗ , expenditure on other goods, constant. Totally differentiating first
order conditions yields:
VW W dW + (VW Z + VW H FZ )dZ = −VW H FX dX
(VZZ + 2VZH FZ + VHH FZ2 + VH FZZ )dZ + (VZW + VHW FZ )dW =

(54)

(55)

= −(VZH FX + VHH FX FZ + VH FZX )dX
The term in front of dZ in the previous equation is ∆22 ≤ 0 (i.e., this is the
(2, 2) element of the negative semidefinite matrix in (53)).
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From (54) we can express dW as:
dW = −

VW H FX dX + (VW Z + VW H FZ )dZ
,
VW W

(56)

and substituting this into (55) yields:
dZ
FZ dX

= FZ

(VZW +VHW FZ )
VW H FX −(VZH FX +VHH FX FZ +VH FZX )
VW W
(V
+V
F )2
∆22 − ZW V HW Z
WW

.

(57)

When we do control for W then we have an expression for the bias which
is similar to what we had before (modulus our new notation). In this case the
regression of health on observable health input X would estimate:
dH
dX
where

=
I ∗ =const,W =const

dZ
dX I ∗ =const,W =const

∂F dZ
∂F
+
∂X ∂Z dX

,

(58)

I ∗ =const,W =const

could be derived using the same equations as above

with dW = 0. In this case, we have
FX FZ +VH FZX )
dZ
FZ dX
= FZ −(VZH FX +VHH
∆22

(59)

In order to estimate relative magnitudes of the bias one would need to
compare expressions (57) and (59).
In the case when we do not control for W the denominator in (57) is smaller
in absolute value than the denominator in (59):

∆22 <

(VZW + VHW FZ )2
∆22 −
VW W



< 040

(60)

This effect, as it works through the denominator, tends to amplify the bias in
40

Note that second order conditions imply that: VW W ∆22 − (VZW + VHW FZ )2 > 0
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the case when we do not control for W .
In order to the understand total effect on the bias term we need to compare
the numerators as well. The term B1 ≡ −(VZH FX + VHH FX FZ + VH FZX )FZ
is contained in both expressions. Earlier we established that this term is likely
to be opposite in sign to FX (see Theorem 1 and Corollary 1).
In the case when we do not control for W we also have an additional term
in the bias:
B2 ≡

(VZW + VHW FZ )
VW H FX FZ
VW W

(61)

This term, however, has an indeterminate sign. To further analyze this term,
it is useful to return to the original function U . Using definition (51) we find:
VZ = −pZ UC
(62)

VH = UH
VW = −pW UC + UW
The first order conditions above can then be written then as:

(63)

−pW UC + UW = 0, −pZ UC + UH FZ = 0
or
pW =

UW
UH FZ
, pZ =
UC
UC

(64)

Thus, we obtain:
VZW = pZ pW UCC − pZ UCW =


FZ ∂
UC
= UH UUW
log
∂C
UW
C
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UH UW FZ
UC



UCC
UC

−

UCW
UW



=
(65)
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VHW = −pW UCH + UW H = −UW


UC
∂
= −UW ∂H log UW



UCH
UC

−

UW H
UW



=
(66)

Using these one can write the bias term B2 in equation (61) as:
B2 =

2 F F2
UW
X Z ∂
VW W
∂H


h 

UC
UC
∂
log UW
log UW −
∂H

As before it is possible to show that

∂
∂C



UH ∂
UC ∂C

log UUWC




i
UC
log UW

(67)

> 0 for a normal good

W , but the sign of the other term is indeterminate as well as the sign of the
whole term B2 .
However, we can determine a sign in the following special case. Assume
that health does not affect the marginal rate of substitution between consump

∂
tion goods W and C: ∂H
log UUWC = 0 (e.g. preferences are weakly separable
in health and non-health goods). Then B2 would vanish and the total bias
will be determined only by the common B1 > 0 term and the denominators in
(60). In this situation the bias will be larger (and the bound less precise) when
one does not control for the observed part of consumption W . The result is


∂
likely to hold also when ∂H
log UUWC is sufficiently close to zero.
The case when Z also has a direct impact on utility can be analyzed similarly. One should define V (Z, W, H; I ∗ ) ≡ U (I ∗ − pZ Z − PW W, Z, W, H)
and the derivation would go unchanged until the equation for the bias term
B2 in equation (61). The exact analogue of condition (67) is more involved
since, when Z has a direct impact on utility, as VZW has more complex form.
However, the formula for the derivative VHW will be unchanged (in terms of
partial derivatives of U ), as will the first order condition with respect to W .
Hence, VHW (and hence B2 ) would vanish under the same condition as before,


UW
∂
namely, ∂H log UC = 0 and the total bias will again be larger in absolute
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value in the case when one does not control for W . Consequently, when one
estimates a home production function, controlling for the chosen amount of a
pure consumption good can result in a smaller bias and a tighter bound for the
estimated marginal product of an observed input to the production function
when not all of the chosen inputs can be observed.
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